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Abstract
This article examines the relationship between observed claim frequencies in the 
automobile insurance line and the evolution of selected economic magnitudes. 
From a variety of economic variables, we aim to identify the main factors affec-
ting claim frequencies, while controlling for other legislative and demographic 
factors. Through a dynamic regression model, the analysis is conducted for three 
different categories of vehicles and for a variety of coverages. A comprehensive 
dataset from the main Spanish insurance companies is used to calibrate the 
model. The evidence might assist companies to improve ratemaking.
Key words: Categories of vehicles, dynamic regression, external predictors, 
motor insurance, time series.
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Resumen
Este artículo examina la relación entre las frecuencias de siniestralidad ob-
servadas en la línea de seguros de automóviles y la evolución de magnitudes 
económicas seleccionadas. A partir de una variedad de variables económicas, 
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2nuestro objetivo es identificar los principales factores que afectan a las frecuen-
cias de siniestralidad, controlando al mismo tiempo otros factores legislativos 
y demográficos. A través de un modelo de regresión dinámica, el análisis se 
realiza para tres categorías diferentes de vehículos y para distintas coberturas. 
Se utiliza una base de datos de las principales compañías de seguros españolas 
para calibrar el modelo. La evidencia podría ayudar a las empresas a mejorar 
su tarificación.
Palabras clave: Categorías de vehículos, regresión dinámica, predictores exter-
nos, seguros de automóviles, series temporales.
Clasificación JEL: C10, C53, E32.
1. Introduction
An adequate understanding of the impact of the economic cycle in the finan-
cial results of the company is one of the big challenges of the insurance sector. 
The inherent variability of the economic situation affects the fundamental fac-
tors that determine the equilibrium between profits and losses. So, an in-depth 
analysis of the performance of the portfolio claims with respect to the evolution 
of economic variables is an important step to understand and ultimately be able 
to modify the underwriting cycle of the insurance sector.
A number of studies have examined the underwriting cycle, e.g., the succession 
of high and low profitability periods in the insurance sector. Most of the research 
focuses attention on insurance pricing as the key element of discussion. The two 
factors involved in the determination of the pure premium of the insurance, the 
claim frequency and the cost per claim, evolve along the economic situation. 
When pricing insurance policies, the technical department of the insurance 
company must take into account all the relevant information regarding expected 
losses of the claim. The divergence between the realized factors and those 
implicit in the pricing determines the profit or loss of the policy. For example, 
Cummins and Outreville (1987) describe a counter-cyclical component to the 
profit cycle. The lag in compiling and incorporating the necessary information 
into new rates would produce a counter-cyclical effect on the results. This is 
explained by the fact that, in expansive periods, premiums would be set with 
costs related to recession periods. So, profits would decrease. As data becomes 
available and costs are adjusted, premiums increase with profits.
A detailed analysis of the impact of the economic cycle into the business 
model can be traced back to Tarbell (1932), where the influence of the economic 
condition in the insurance business is studied for different lines. In the case of 
automobile lines, and according to the author, in recession periods we observe 
a decrease in income that leads to a reduction of traveled distance. However, 
for the same reason, there exists an incentive for drivers of reduced income to 
profit from trivial accidents, also discouraging to keep motor vehicles in proper 
3conditions and repair. Also, higher unemployment rates would encourage burglar-
ies, thefts and robberies, so an increase of claim frequencies should be expected.
The direct quantitative relationship between the underwriting cycle and the 
economic cycle has been less studied in the literature. Early studies, such as 
Fairley (1979), find negative correlations between loss costs in the insurance 
sector and stock returns, as pointed out by Feldblum (2001). These results 
would suggest a link between underwriting and economic cycle. However, 
the relationship is not conclusive, as shown by D’Arcy and Garven (1990) or 
Kozik (1994).
Another research line closer to our objectives is based on the use of dynamic 
macro models to study the relationship between the number of road accidents 
and potential explanatory factors (Hakim et al., 1991). Applying this methodol-
ogy, it is possible to assess the impact of economic, demographic or legislative 
factors in the frequency of road accidents from the point of view of road safety. 
For example, fuel price has been identified as a major influencing factor in the 
number of traffic crashes, as studied in Grabowsky and Morrisey (2006), Chi 
et al. (2010) or Chi et al. (2015). The reason is that, in response to gasoline price 
increases, we observe a less frequent, more conservative and more fuel-efficient 
driving behavior, therefore improving traffic safety. Also, higher employment 
rates and poverty levels have been associated with road casualties (Noland and 
Quddus, 2004) and crashes (Aguero-Valverde and Jovanis, 2006).
More recently, some authors have studied the long-term effects of economic 
growth in road safety. For example, the results in Elvik (2010) and Nghiem et al. 
(2013) suggest that traffic accidents initially increase with economic develop-
ment before declining after reaching certain thresholds of per capita income. 
According to the results, it is expected that technological innovation in vehicle 
manufacturing and road construction leads to a reduction of claim frequency 
rates. These factors would outweigh other countervailing factors related to 
economic growth such as the increase in travel frequency.
In our study we aim to extend the literature identifying, from a wide list of 
economic factors, those with potential to affect vehicle claim frequency within 
an insurance context. From the insurance company point of view, the possibility 
to model the relationship between the economic cycle and the claim frequency 
would become a key element to adjust the subscription cycle to the economic 
cycle. A precise rate making system would allow insurers to compute adequate 
provisions for contingencies.
The analysis is performed for three different categories of vehicles, according 
to their common characteristics. The first category corresponds to passenger cars 
and vans. In the second category, we include bigger commercial vehicles such 
as trucks, buses, agricultural machinery, trailers and semi-trailers. Finally, we 
consider a third category of vehicles that comprises motorcycles and scooters.
As a novelty, for each of the three categories of vehicles we present data 
segregated by different coverages: general liability, which includes liabilities for 
corporal damage and material damage, own damage (without cost for the insured 
party per accident), theft and legal defense. Although the claim frequencies of 
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particular behaviors that have not been identified in previous literature.
To identify the main factors affecting claim frequency data we employ a 
methodology based on dynamic regression models with ARIMA errors, taking 
into account calendar effects and outlier detection. The methodology combines 
elements from regression models with elements from time-series analysis.
Our study suggests that it is possible to identify several economic factors 
related to the claim frequency for different categories of automobiles and for 
different types of coverages. This information may be useful in order to deter-
mine the pricing policy in insurance companies taking into account elements 
of future claim frequencies, and therefore, serving as a basis to produce more 
accurate pricing models.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the data. 
Section 3 presents the regression model used to identify the main factors explain-
ing the claim frequency for different types of categories and coverages. Results 
from the estimation are reported in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. Data and regulation
2.1. Claim frequency
In this paper we consider claim frequency data as defined by the ratio of 
reported claims to total exposure. By reported claims we mean reported claims 
during the corresponding period, independent from the moment of its occur-
rence, that are qualified for coverage and imply compensation from the insurance 
company. With respect to the total exposure, policy insurances are accounted 
considering the fraction of the corresponding period that provide coverage.
The number of reported claims and the risk exposures for this study have 
been provided by an association of the major Spanish insurance companies. 
From this data, the claim frequency series have been constructed. At the origin 
of the sample period, the collection comprised data from 55 companies, which 
represent the vast majority of the insurance sector in Spain. During the period 
under consideration, a significant number of mergers and consolidations have 
been taken place, so that the final number of companies has been reduced to 47.
We consider quarterly data for the period 2005-2015. The first datum cor-
responds to the second quarter of 2005, whereas the last datum corresponds 
to the fourth quarter of 2015. In total, we use 43 data points in the series. No 
missing observations arose during the compilation of the data. The considered 
period comprises the last years of the economic expansion cycle, a subsequent 
severe long phase of economic crisis and the first years of recovery.
As stated in the introduction, we regroup the data in three different categories 
of vehicles. Category I corresponds to passenger cars and vans. Commercial 
vehicles such as trucks, buses, agricultural machinery, trailers and semi-trailers 
are included in Category II. Finally, Category III comprises motorcycles and 
scooters.
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CLAIM FREQUENCY SERIES FOR DIFFERENT CATEGORIES AND COVERAGES
For each of the three categories, we consider different coverages. The first is 
general liability, which includes liabilities for body injury and property damage 
to third parties and their property, but not to the driver or the driver’s property. 
The second one is own damage, which offers protection against damage to 
the insured vehicle incurred during and accident caused by the policyholder. 
6Damages caused by theft of the vehicle are excluded. Theft is the third coverage 
included in the analysis. Through this coverage, the insurer will indemnify the 
insured for the total or partial removal of the vehicle. Also, damages caused 
during the time that, as a consequence of the theft, the automobile was in the 
hands of outsiders, as well as the damages caused by committing the theft or 
attempt of it, are included in the policy. Legal defense is the last coverage. It 
covers the legal assistance and expenses generated both in processes initiated to 
claim compensations or damages and in those that have the purpose of defending 
the policyholder, always within the limits established in the policy. It should 
be noted that expenses derived from the suspension of the driving license are 
excluded from coverage.
After the data cleaning process described in Section 3, Figure 1 depicts the 
evolution of claim frequencies for the considered period. We observe a clear 
decreasing trend on the general liability coverage since the beginning of the 
analyzed period. Although there is some variability associated, the claim fre-
quencies quickly decrease, especially during the first years. In the later years, 
however, although we still observe a clear decreasing trend, the reduction is 
less pronounced. For the rest of coverages, we find different patterns depend-
ing on the category of vehicles. Own damage coverage shows a bump in claim 
frequency ratios around the central years of the sample period in Categories I 
and II. Category III, instead, shows a decreasing trend similar to the general 
liability case.
The theft coverage also performs differently across categories. The claim 
frequency in Category I halves during the sample period. Categories II and III, 
however, experience increases along the years, although in the last period the 
claim frequencies return to the level of initial registers. Legal defense series also 
differ across coverages, with a pronounced decrease in Categories I and III and 
an oscillation in Category II.
Table 1 provides some statistics of the claim frequencies. It can be clearly 
observed that the coverage with the smallest claim frequencies is theft. Not only 
claims related to stolen vehicles are less common: its variability is also smaller 
than in other coverages, and therefore, smaller differences are generally detected 
across quarters. Also legal defense presents small claim frequencies and vola-
tilities, at least during the sample period. In the opposite situation we find own 
damage, particularly Category I, that presents a much higher claim frequency 
rate and volatility. It suggests a more difficult task of forecasting future values 
of this variable for insurers. In the medium term we find general liability, with 
more stable claim frequencies over time compared to own damage.
2.2. Explanatory variables
This study makes use of data relative to the global activity of the Spanish 
economy drawn from a variety of public sources: National Statistics Office, 
Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Public Works and Bank of 
Spain. The criteria for variable selection is to choose those variables, published 
7on a monthly or quarterly basis, that may well represent the state of the 
economy.
In some cases, the variables may be leading indicators of the economy. That 
is usually the case of the stock index, which tends to anticipate the state of the 
economy. In our case, since we employ Spanish data for the claim frequency, 
we select the corresponding stock index, the IBEX-35 index (IBEX35). Also, 
we include a broader leading indicator, the composite leading indicator (CLI) 
from the OECD. The CLI is constructed from a series of short-term economic 
components that tend to precede changes in the total economy, such as the rate 
of capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector or the production of total con-
struction. Although the OECD computes the CLI for a wide range of countries 
and economies, in our analysis we just use the CLI for Spain.
General economy activity is represented through the variables real GDP per 
capita in euros (GDP), Industrial Production Index (IPI), unemployment rate 
(UPR), volume of total retail trade sales (RET) and Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
whereas the structure of the economy is taken into account through the variables 
number of worked hours in construction sector relative to the total worked hours 
(CONS) and the number of worked hours in service sector relative to the total 
worked hours (SERV). The last two variables are also stated in index terms.
In order to cope with the financial factors affecting the economy, we use the 
one-year Euribor (EURIBOR) and the return on invested capital minus cost on 
capital (CAP) excluding financial sector.
Variables related to construction and real estate market are also incorporated. 
We select the index of construction cost (CONSCOST), the housing price index 
(HOUSE), the number of mortgages relative to the total housing properties 
(MORT) and the total number of real estate transactions (REAL, in thousands), 
with this purpose.
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF STATISTICS OF THE CLAIM FREQUENCY SERIES
Mean Standarddeviation Minimum Maximum
General Liability Category I 0.02550 0.00326 0.02022 0.03649
Category II 0.03402 0.00973 0.02305 0.05888
Category III 0.01062 0.00276 0.00699 0.01738
Own Damage Category I 0.10314 0.01422 0.06994 0.13012
Category II 0.04276 0.00836 0.02779 0.06054
Category III 0.01038 0.00990 0.00224 0.06323
Theft Category I 0.00352 0.00082 0.00217 0.00573
Category II 0.00265 0.00068 0.00127 0.00399
Category III 0.00245 0.00051 0.00158 0.00396
Legal Defense Category I 0.00548 0.00085 0.00418 0.00803
Category II 0.00356 0.00067 0.00235 0.00515
Category III 0.00469 0.00085 0.00322 0.00702
8The study also controls for other factors that may affect traffic accidents, 
such as number of registered vehicles in absolute value (TOTNVEH, in thou-
sands) and per capita (NVEH), and fuel price (FUELPRICE, in index terms). 
Demographic factors such as population (POP, in thousands), population above 
65 years (OLDPOP, in thousands) and proportion of population above 65 years 
(AGEPOP) are included. Also, electricity consumption in absolute value (ELEC, 
in ktep) and per person (PERELEC, in ktep per thousand) are considered.
Finally, we take into account four calendar effects: trading day effect (TRAD), 
holidays effect (HOL), Easter effect (EAST) and leap-year effect. Calendar 
effects will be handled through the TRAMO-SEATS application, as will be 
described in the next section.
Table 2 provides a summary of statistics of the main explanatory variables 
used in the empirical analysis. Initially, we consider all the factors described 
above. However, as will be explained in Section 3, for every category and cover-
age the number of factors will be reduced. Those factors that may be redundant 
or cause reverse causality will be dropped from consideration.
2.3. Regulatory factors
It is a common approach (e.g., Castillo-Manzano et al., 2011 or Dadashova 
et al., 2014) to include the effect of legislative actions that might affect the 
behavior of drivers, and therefore, reduce the number of accidents. In terms of 
our problem, the effect of the legislative modifications is expected to reduce the 
claim frequency in those coverages that are related.
For our particular set of data, we take into account major modifications of 
the Spanish regulation related to accidents. In the period under consideration, 
two major laws have been enacted to induce a reduction of the number of 
accidents.
Through Law 17/2005, to apply from July 2006, the Spanish government 
established a penalty point system with the aim to raise awareness and penalize 
those drivers committing severe traffic offenses. Departing from a total of twelve 
points, offenders are penalized with a reduction of points. The severity of the 
traffic infringement determines the number of lost points. The regulation also 
allows to credit drivers with a null record of traffic offenses with extra points, 
as well as the re-education of those drivers sanctioned with a partial or total 
loss of the assigned points.
The second reform we will take into account is the penal code reform enacted 
trough Law 15/2007. According to the reform, certain violations of speed limits 
shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of three to five months, jointly 
with a license disqualification from one to four years. Also, driving under the 
influence of alcohol, illicit drugs or related substances shall be punishable in 
the same terms. The Law entered into force in December 2007.
Both reforms enter the model in the form of dummy variables (DRIVLIC 
and CRIMCODE, respectively). In particular, the penalty point system variable 
takes a value of 0 until the second quarter of 2006 and a value of 1 afterwards. 
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Name Units Mean Std Dev Min Max
AGEPOP Per mille 171.89 7.47 164.36 187.31
CAP Percentage 5.79 1.68 3.30 9.40
CLI Index number, base=100 100.39 1.25 98.17 102.54
CONS Number hours per 100 hours 103.05 1.72 100.75 107.04
CONSCOST Index number, base=100 100.69 4.61 89.06 107.90
CPI Index number, base=100 96.16 6.86 82.12 104.56
CRIMCOD Binary
DRIVLIC Binary
ELEC Ktep (thousands of tonnes) 5214.03 303.91 4660.06 5873.23
EURIBOR Percentage 2.04 1.52 0.06 5.38
FUELPRICE Index number, base=100 87.70 16.11 58.99 114.25
GDP Euros per inhabitant 5656.97 329.21 4791.13 6287.84
HOUSE Index number, base=100 81.29 14.04 63.64 101.42
IBEX35 Index number 10441.88 2076.68 6738.10 15890.50
IPI Index number, base=100 106.11 14.62 85.44 131.60
MORT Thousands of mortgages 263.17 153.05 68.31 520.10
NVEH Units of vehicles per 100 
inhabitants
70.46 1.98 64.76 72.19
OLDPOP Thousands of inhabitants 7862.80 492.48 7150.47 8699.89
PERELEC Ktep per 1000 persons 114.13 7.10 100.31 127.06
POP Thousands of inhabitants 45712.99 1256.52 42703.31 46792.31
REAL Thousands of transactions 142.54 61.95 54.84 251.65
RET Index number, base=100 98.16 12.77 71.10 120.31
TOTNVEH Thousands of vehicles 32234.33 1730.15 27653.46 33498.50
SERV Number hours per 100 hours 99.68 0.29 98.96 100.44
UPR Per mille 170.45 67.81 79.32 269.35
The penal code reform takes a value of 0 until the third quarter of 2007 and a 
value of 1 afterwards.
Note that other important modifications concerning vehicle safety as the 
compulsory use of seat belts for all passengers, helmets and other safety devices, 
driving and rest time, are previous to the period under study, so we will not take 
them into account.
3. Methodology
To identify the main factors affecting claim frequency data we employ a
methodology based on dynamic regression models with ARIMA errors. The 
methodology, that combines elements from regression models with elements 
from time-series, is a common tool to identify the most relevant factors affecting 
a given dependent variable by analyzing time dependency in the observed data. 
For a detailed description of this method, see Pankratz (1991). The complexity 
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of this procedure is due to the non-stationary nature of the relationship between 
explanatory variables and claim frequency. Similar approach has been followed 
by Wagenaar (1984), Van den Bossche et al. (2004) or García-ferrer et al. (2007) 
in the context of traffic safety.
In the following, we describe a unified stepwise procedure to establish an 
appropriate regression model relating explanatory and dependent variables, 
while examining the computational aspects of the process. A good starting 
point discussing the methodology is Andrews et al. (2013). In our explanation, 
we establish two stages. The first stage corresponds to the necessary steps to 
ensure non-stationarity of the time series and to reduce the potential number of 
explanatory variables. The second one corresponds to the regression procedure. 
In the later stage we use the TRAMO-SEATS methodology to choose the best 
model and provide the estimation and significance of the regression parameters. 
To choose the best final model TRAMO-SEATS uses the regression variables 
input by the user and generates trading day (with several specifications), Easter, 
intervention variables and outliers. Then, fits exact maximum likelihood estimation 
of the regression ARIMA model; makes diagnostics; detection and correction 
of outliers (Additive Outlier, AO, Transitory Change, TC, Level Shift, LS, and 
Innovational Outlier, IO); and optimal interpolation of missing observations and 
associated standard errors. Finally, computes optimal forecasts and associated 
standard errors.
3.1. Data preparation and processing
The first step in our approach is data cleaning, to avoid reporting errors that 
may arise during the compilation of the claim frequency information. Otherwise, 
errors may appear as outlier observations, which are sampled from the tail of the 
distribution and therefore have a strong influence on parameter estimation. If 
qi,t denotes the claim frequency of company i during the quarter t, we eliminate 
those observations exceeding certain thresholds given by
(1) qt ?3? qt < qi,t < qt +3? qt ,
where qt  denotes the weighted claim frequency mean in quarter t and ? qt
denotes the weighted standard deviation in the same quarter t.
After the data cleaning process we take natural logarithm of all variables, 
except for the dummy variables. The advantage of this procedure is twofold. 
In the one hand, we mitigate potential problems derived from the skewness 
of the variable distributions. On the other hand, estimated coefficients can be 
interpreted in an easy way as elasticities.
In some cases it might be necessary to difference the series in its seasonal 
and non-seasonal components in order to transform the non-stationary series into 
a stationary one. Non-stationarity frequently arises in series with trend or with 
seasonality. If we estimate the model while any of the series are non-stationary, 
the estimated coefficients can be incorrect. In order to determine the number 
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of non-seasonal differences we apply augmented Dickey-Fuller, ADF, unit root 
test. For the seasonal component, we use the Canova-Hansen test (Canova and 
Hansen, 1995), testing the null hypothesis of deterministic seasonality. As sug-
gested in Andrews et al. (2013), we test the dependent time series and apply 
the same differencing scheme to all the exogenous candidates. Nevertheless, 
we do not prevent the automatic estimation procedure to further difference the 
residuals if considered necessary.
One of the main methodological problems that may arise within this context 
is to mistake the causal relationship between the variables. In order to make 
sure that the independent variable does not receive feedback from the dependent 
variables, we employ the Granger causality test. According to this method, and 
for the bi-variate case, the first variable is said to cause the second variable in 
the Granger sense if the forecast for the second variable improves when lagged 
variables for the first variable are taken into account (Granger, 1969). In our 
procedure, a causality analysis of the mutual relationship between the claim 
frequency and each of the explanatory variables is conducted. If the test detects 
reverse causality, the exogenous variable is eliminated. We employ a causality 
test at 5% level departing from the log transformed variables using the lmtest 
package for R (Zeileis and Hothorn, 2002).
To easy the complexity of the estimation process and to reduce the number 
of explanatory factors, two extra steps are taken for each category and coverage. 
Firstly, as explanatory factors are only included those predictors with a significant 
correlation with the dependent variable. For this aim, function cor.test of the R 
package stats is used in computing (Pearson) correlation tests at a 95% confidence 
level. Factors that do not show significant correlation with the corresponding 
claim frequency are discarded. Secondly, in order to avoid multicollinearity issues 
(see, e.g., Allen, 1997 and Belsley, 1991), an ad-hoc selection process is carried 
out by taking into account the correlation matrix among risk factors jointly with 
the correlation between risk factors and claim frequency, and through the use of 
the VIF (Variance Inflation Factor), dropping those variables with a VIF higher 
than 5 (Menard, 1995). Figure 2 summarizes the process.
3.2. Estimation procedure
Once the first stage is finished and the data is prepared, the second stage 
proceeds to construct the regression model and to estimate its parameters. Let 
yt = (y1,…,yT) be the vector of observed values of the dependent variable. If we 
denote by xit the observation of the regression variable i (i = 1,…,n) in period t, 
and βi its corresponding regression coefficient, we assume that the endogenous
variable yt is generated by the model
(2) yt =
i=1
n
??ixit + zt ,
where the errors zt follow an ARIMA (p, d, q)(P, D, Q)s process.
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In terms of the backshift operator (or lag operator) B, such that Bzt = zt–1, 
and more generally, Bnzt = zt–n, the ARIMA process can be rewritten as
(3) ? B( )? Bs( )? B( ) zt =? B( )? Bs( )at .
Under the backshift notation, on the left hand side of the equality, ? B( )  
denotes the autoregression operator ? B( ) = 1+?1B+ ?+?pBp( ) ,  ? Bs( )  is the
seasonal autoregressive operator ? Bs( ) = 1+?sBs + ?+?Ps BPs( ) and ? B( )  reflects
the seasonal and non-seasonal difference ? B( ) = 1? B( )d 1? Bs( )D .  On the right
hand side, we have ? B( ) ,  the moving average operator ? B( ) =  1+?1B+?+?qBq( ) ,
and ? Bs( ) ,  the seasonal autoregressive operator ? Bs( ) = 1+?sBs + ?+?QsBQs( ).
The at’s are independent normal variates with mean 0 and variance ? a
2 . Being
the data of quarterly nature, we set s = 4.
The estimation is carried out using TRAMO-SEATS tool, which allows 
specifying ARIMA errors taking into account calendar effects and outlier detec-
tion. For our purpose, however, only the TRAMO (Time series Regression with 
ARIMA noise, Missing observations and Outliers) part is necessary. Some of the 
FIGURE 2
DATA PREPARATION FLOW CHART
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regression variables can be inputted by the user (we introduce several economic 
and legal variables) while other ones are generated by the program (trading day, 
Easter effect and intervention variables of several types). The program estimates 
both the parameters of the regression model and the ARIMA model for the 
errors by exact maximum likelihood (by default) although the unconditional 
and conditional least squares methods are available as options. It also detects 
and corrects for several types of outliers, computes optimal forecasts for the 
series, yields optimal interpolators of the missing observations and performs an 
automatic model identification of the ARIMA models. The basic methodology 
used is described in Gómez and Maravall (1994) but for complete details we 
refer to Gómez and Maravall (1996) and Maravall et al. (2014). Although some 
authors highlight the pitfalls of automatic variable selection methods (Harrell, 
2001 or Burnham and Anderson, 2002), we are confident in following this ap-
proach for the problem considered in this paper.
4. Estimation results
In this section we present estimation results of the model described in
Section 3. As explained above, the procedure can be roughly summarized in 
two stages. The first stage in the process comprises data collection and cleaning. 
Once the data has been treated, we take logarithms and test for reverse causal-
ity and non-stationarity of the series. After selecting the better candidates as 
explanatory variables and properly differencing, in a second stage regressions 
are run and results are examined.
Along the section, we report the regression results grouped by coverages 
(general liability, own damage, theft and legal defense), so that each table collects 
results for the three automobile categories under the same coverage. Regression 
coefficients are provided jointly with the usual t-statistics (in parenthesis), and 
asterisk symbols are facilitated in order to indicate the significance for different 
levels. We also report variables that correspond to important outliers (OUT) and 
calendar effects (TRAD/HOL/EAST).
Since the methodology applied allows the residuals to follow an unknown 
ARIMA structure, its parameters must be estimated for its seasonal and non-
seasonal parts. Therefore, parameter estimation results are also reported for each 
case. The optimal values of the parameters are automatically computed trough 
the TRAMO-SEATS adjustment procedure.
Under the hypothesis of the model, residuals are assumed to be normally 
distributed and serially independent. So, a complete analysis must be performed 
to check that the desired statistical properties are met. TRAMO-SEATS pro-
vides a battery of tests to ensure the quality of the adjustment (see, pp. 23-24 of 
Maravall et al., 2014). The residual diagnostics include checks on zero mean, 
lack of residual autocorrelation, normality, skewness, kurtosis, random residual 
signs, seasonality detection, and others.
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In order to reinforce the validity of the results, we provide an extra analysis 
of the regression residuals. The normality assumption is first evaluated by visual 
inspection of the histogram of the residuals versus the normal probability plot, 
examining the resemblance of both representations. However, since graphical 
methods are known to be deceptive, and incorrect conclusions may be taken 
on the basis of a visual inspection, we use additional normality tests to obtain 
more conclusive assessments.
4.1. General liability
We start by analyzing the results on general liability coverage, which is 
the most important automobile coverage in terms of volume of premiums. It 
covers physical injury as well as damage to property involuntarily caused to a 
third party. In Spain, the compulsory insurance of motor vehicles guarantees 
coverage of civil liability. The amounts of the compulsory insurance coverage 
are 70 million Euros per claim in damages to persons, whatever the number of 
victims and 15 million Euros per claim in damage to property (Law 21/2007). 
The above amounts are updated based on the European consumer price index. 
If the amount of the compensation is greater than the amount of the compulsory 
insurance coverage, this maximum amount will be paid, and the remainder up to 
the total amount of the compensations will be paid by the voluntary insurance 
or the person responsible for the loss.
Table 3 reports the results of the relationship between claim frequency re-
lated to general liability coverage and several predictors. Before the regression, 
Categories I, II and III have been differenced with respect to its non-seasonal 
component. We only include in the table those predictors that were not discarded 
because of reverse causality or because they did not show significant correla-
tion with the dependent variable and therefore have been incorporated into the 
dynamic regression. The table reports estimated coefficients and t-values of the 
regression. The estimated ARIMA (p, d, q)(P, D, Q) structure for the residuals 
is reported at the bottom of the table.
According to the results, we find that regulatory measures are the most sig-
nificant among the considered variables affecting Category I. In particular, it is 
crucial the introduction of the penalty point system. As expected, the tightening 
of traffic regulation impacts negatively the claim frequency rate of passenger 
cars: the threat of severe sanctions, including the possibility of loss of the driv-
ing license, represses an aggressive driving attitude.
In Category II we find a negative relationship, although feeble, with un-
employment rate. This finding is consistent with previous literature: a higher 
unemployment rate implies less driving and a safer driving attitude, which 
results in lower claim frequency rates. Also, the Easter effect has been found to 
be significant in this category. Since vehicles included in Category II are fun-
damentally related to working effects, it is reasonable that the Easter holidays 
imply a reduction of activity within this class of vehicles, therefore incurring 
in lower claim frequencies.
15
We found Category III, in the case of general liability, to be the most difficult 
series under study to model. From all the candidate explanatory variables, only 
two of them we considered to have a potential influence, and only the penalty 
point system variable is found to be weakly significant. So, the effect of eco-
nomic variables on motorbike and scooter claims, for this particular coverage, 
keeps pending of further strong evidence.
According to the diagnostics obtained while running TRAMO-SEATS, residu-
als present a good behavior in all the examined components and therefore the 
regression is qualified as “good”, in the TRAMO-SEATS terminology. Also, with 
the aim to reassess the quality model, we graphically check the distribution of 
the residuals in Figure 3, plotting its histograms for each of the three categories.
Histograms (Figure 3) show a normal pattern in the three cases except pos-
sibly in the far right tail. In order to reinforce the acceptance of the normality 
hypothesis, we perform three complementary normality tests on the residuals: 
TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF THE MODEL FOR GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE
Predictors Category I Category II Category III
CAP 0.052238(0.07817)
0.097122
(0.21923)
CPI 2.466700(2.01853)
CRIMCODE -0.025915(0.04305)
-0.040669
(0.03452)
0.017256
(0.02086)
DRIVLIC -0.184630**(0.06556)
0.040049
(0.02458)
-0.032412·
(0.01932)
ELEC -2.291100(6.03885)
GDP -0.414710(0.57861)
-0.760050
(0.89412)
PERELEC -0.012036(0.30106)
3.078800
(6.12696)
REAL 0.090039(0.06311)
0.025352
(0.08336)
RET -0.331980(0.25828)
UPR -0.429470·(0.22867)
EAST1 -0.125570*(0.04887)
OUT1 (2) -0.367240**(0.10463)
ARIMA model (0,1,1)(0,0,0)4 (0,0,1)(0,1,1)4 (3,0,0)(0,0,0)4
AIC -79.6311 -96.2673 -47.6946
BIC -4.4186 -4.8662 -3.8337
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. ***, **, * and · indicate significance at 0.1, 1, 5 and 10% 
levels (t-statistic). The outlier observation number is indicated in parenthesis.
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Shapiro-Wilk, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Geary. They all test the null hypoth-
esis that the observations come from a normal population. So, higher p-values 
support the normality of the residuals.
Results on tests are reported in Table 4. At 5% level, only the Shapiro-Wilk 
test would reject the null hypothesis of normality for Categories II and III. The 
rest of the tests support the normality of the residuals.
With respect to the autocorrelation of the residuals, Table 5 collects the 
results on the performed tests (Ljung-Box and Friedman), which show no sign 
of autocorrelation problems.
FIGURE 3
DISTRIBUTIONS OF RESIDUALS. GENERAL LIABLITY COVERAGE
TABLE 4
NORMALITY TESTS OF RESIDUALS. GENERAL LIABILITY
Shapiro-Wilk Kolmogorov-Smirnov Geary
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Category I 0.97450 0.6316 0.11582 0.3369 0.82240 0.3155
Category II 0.90737 0.0148 0.13624 0.1833 0.75641 0.8955
Category III 0.94083 0.0405 0.13265 0.0813 0.74795 0.9485
TABLE 5
AUTOCORRELATION AND SEASONALITY TESTS OF RESIDUALS. 
GENERAL LIABILITY
Ljung-Box Friedman
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Category I 11.84 0.3754 1.65 0.6481
Category II 8.55 0.5752 0.26 0.9679
Category III 12.95 0.1647 3.27 0.3523
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4.2. Own damage
We next analyze the impact of economic and related variables to claim 
frequencies for own damage coverage. Own damage covers damages to the 
policyholder’s vehicle in transit and possible related incidences as fire or external 
explosion. It does not include damages to passengers nor mechanical failures 
which are not produced by accidents. Own damage is usually part of a fully 
comprehensive insurance policy, so it is usually found in insurance policies 
covering new vehicles. It should be noted that in Spain, some extraordinary risks, 
such as damages caused by terrorism or atypical severe natural phenomena are 
compensated by a special Consortium, and therefore, are not included in the 
own damage coverage.
In this case, Category III series has been differenced in its non-seasonal 
component, whereas Category II has been differenced with respect to its sea-
sonal component, to ensure stationarity. Table 6 collects the estimation results.
Compared to the general liability case, results provide more insight on the 
impact of explanatory variables on claim frequencies. Category I shows a negative 
effect from the Industrial Production Index. An increase of industrial activity 
means a decrease in claim frequency rates. Also, electricity consumption has a 
negative impact on claim frequency rates. A possible explanation is that these 
variables reflect an improvement of economic activity and therefore levels of 
wealthiness, which are usually related to lower levels of fraud. As the economy 
improves, individuals are more reluctant to claim own damages in cases where 
that would pose to commit an act of fraud, and vice versa.
Although insurance fraud has been object of multiple studies (see Artís 
et al., 1999, Tennyson and Salsas-Forn, 2002 or Ngai et al., 2011), the connec-
tion between fraud and economic indicators has not been much analyzed in the 
academic literature. Apart from Lawal et al. (2017), we could not find recent 
quantitative studies relating the two aspects. However, this relationship has 
been suggested in the professional practice. For example, Nick Starling, former 
director of general insurance and health of the Association of British Insurers, 
emphasized that “Fraud thrives in a recession, so insurers are intensifying their 
crackdown on insurance cheats”1.
Categories II and III are mainly affected by legal reforms. Both the introduc-
tion of the penalty point system and the criminal code reform are found to affect 
claim frequency rates on both categories. However, the impact of the reforms 
is mixed, simultaneously affecting in a positive and negative manner. We have 
no explanation for this mixed effect, since the reform of the penal code or the 
introduction of the penalty point system should not apparently have a positive 
impact on claim frequencies.
Models for the three categories have been found to be good enough accord-
ing to TRAMO-SEATS set of diagnostics. As in the previous subsection, we 
1 Insurance Day, Issue 2902, p. 6.
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TABLE 6
SUMMARY OF THE MODEL FOR OWN DAMAGE COVERAGE
Predictors Category I Category II Category III
CAP -0.118480·
(0.06511)
-0.034923
(0.20628)
CRIMCODE -0.001428
(0.00794)
-0.083315**
(0.02999)
0.230880·
(0.12235)
DRIVLIC -0.014022
(0.01424)
0.076368**
(0.02805)
-0.235690*
(0.11535)
GDP 1.088000
(1.28372)
IPI -0.105300**
(0.02976)
MORT 0.130260
(0.09679)
OLDPOP 1.466300
(2.57143)
PERELEC -0.930730***
(0.21387)
REAL 0.480220·
(0.25762)
RET -0.002586
(0.18024)
SERV -7.855000*
(3.60476)
12.20700
(9.64079)
OUT1(16) 0.223970***
(0.04875)
OUT2 (31) -0.198000***
(0.04386)
ARIMA model (0, 0, 1)(0, 0, 0)4 (2, 0, 0)(1, 1, 0)4 (0, 0, 3)(0, 0, 0)4
AIC -108.6503 -41.8600 -41.5195
BIC -5.0248 -3.6818 -1.5438
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. ***, **, * and · indicate significance at 0.1, 1, 5 and 10% 
levels (t-statistic). The outlier observation number is indicated in parenthesis.
FIGURE 4
DISTRIBUTIONS OF RESIDUALS. OWN DAMAGE COVERAGE
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also analyze the residuals in order to check the normality and autocorrelation 
of the residuals (Figure 4).
With respect to the normality tests (Table 7), none of them reject the null 
hypothesis at 5% level except the Shapiro-Wilk applied to Category III. Also 
similarly, the Geary test provides a high confidence on the normality assumption 
for the same Category III, in opposition to what the Shapiro-Wilk test suggests.
Finally, the autocorrelation of the residuals seems to be under control, ac-
cording to the results in Table 8.
TABLE 7
NORMALITY TESTS OF RESIDUALS. OWN DAMAGE
Shapiro-Wilk Kolmogorov-Smirnov Geary
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Category I 0.97198 0.5556 0.11631 0.3305 0.84406 0.1295
Category II 0.93665 0.0602 0.13037 0.1804 0.79726 0.6010
Category III 0.92007 0.0143 0.11837 0.2453 0.71983 0.9845
TABLE 8
AUTOCORRELATION AND SEASONALITY TESTS OF RESIDUALS. OWN DAMAGE
Ljung-Box Friedman
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Category I 11.28 0.4198 5.55 0.1357
Category II 9.42 0.3993 1.20 0.7530
Category III 5.00 0.8347 2.25 0.5222
4.3. Theft
Another coverage interesting of study is theft. The intuition suggests that, 
as the economy improves, the number of theft cases should decrease, and vice 
versa. Results should thus support this intuition.
Table 9 shows the impact of explanatory variables in theft coverage. In 
this case, it has only been necessary to difference the non-seasonal component 
in Categories I and II. In Category I we find a very strong positive influence 
between unemployment rate and theft. In periods where unemployment rates 
rise, so does theft. Thus, unemployment acts as a natural trigger of criminal 
activity as a consequence of the economic needs of the population. The effect 
is reinforced observing the negative relationship between construction costs and 
claim frequencies. In periods of higher construction activity (and therefore higher 
construction costs), levels of theft decrease. Along the same line of reasoning, 
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TABLE 9
SUMMARY OF THE MODEL FOR THEFT COVERAGE
Predictors Category I Category II Category III
AGEPOP -3.54110*
(1.51143)
CAP -0.247440·
(0.13408)
CONS -1.284600·
(0.65848)
CONSCOST -1.622600**
(0.56952)
CRIMCODE -0.025829·
(0.01287)
-0.117610*
(0.05323)
-0.281160*
(0.10774)
DRIVLIC -0.000225
(0.01281)
0.095570·
(0.04950)
-0.443960**
(0.14442)
FUELPRICE 0.122560
(0.12667)
0.512890·
(0.28198)
GDP -0.413230
(0.74177)
HOUSE -0.000003*
(0.00000)
MORT -0.415940**
(0.14764)
PERELEC 0.310790
(0.56337)
RET 0.128070
(0.24236)
SERV -10.52600
(9.16695)
TOTNVEH 3.18960
(2.9992)
UPR 0.402380***
(0.07494)
OUT1 (17) -0.152490**
(0.05001)
ARIMA model (0, 0, 1)(0, 0, 0)4 (1, 0, 0)(0, 0, 0)4 (0, 0, 0)(0, 0, 0)4
AIC -125.5587 -31.3536 -38.7056
BIC -5.5101 -3.4166 -3.4464
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. ***, **, * and · indicate significance at 0.1, 1, 5 and 10% 
levels (t-statistic). The outlier observation number is indicated in parenthesis.
the improvement of wealth levels among the population would reduce the need 
of committing illegal activities and thus deter crimes related to theft.
A similar pattern is perceived in Category III. Significant factors that imply 
an improvement of the economy are found to be negatively correlated with theft. 
It is the case of house pricing index and mortgage indicators. Also legal factors 
are found to have a negative impact, but there is no plausible explanation on 
its effects on theft.
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The analysis of residuals performed by TRAMO-SEATS reflects a good 
fitting. A graphical representation of the density of the residuals is shown in 
Figure 5, where histogram plots resemble those of a normal distribution.
Normality test on the residuals (Table 10) corroborate the results. None of 
the tests reveal problems with respect to the normality of the residuals. Even the 
Shapiro-Wilk test, which has been shown to be the strictest out of the three nor-
mality tests in the previous subsections, does not reflect problems on this aspect, 
assigning high p-values to all categories. Also, according to the test results in 
Table 11, residuals do not show presence of serial autocorrelation at higher lags.
FIGURE 5
DISTRIBUTIONS OF RESIDUALS. THEFT COVERAGE
TABLE 10
NORMALITY TESTS OF RESIDUALS. THEFT
Shapiro-Wilk Kolmogorov-Smirnov Geary
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Category I 0.96737 0.3930 0.10419 0.4591 0.74371 0.9520
Category II 0.96182 0.2444 0.10921 0.3410 0.77300 0.8145
Category III 0.96943 0.5237 0.11953 0.3355 0.73493 0.9675
TABLE 11
AUTOCORRELATION AND SEASONALITY TESTS OF RESIDUALS. THEFT
Ljung-Box Friedman
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Category I 7.84 0.7274 9.90 0.0194
Category II 7.02 0.7977 6.07 0.1084
Category III 10.96 0.5320 1.11 0.7736
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4.4. Legal defense
Finally, Table 12 collects results from the regression model concerning 
legal defense coverage. Categories I, II and III have been differenced in its 
non-seasonal components.
The increase in construction activity, usually a reflection of higher economic 
activity, is found to have a negative effect on Categories I and II. As the economy 
boosts, we observe less incentives to claim for damages. In Category II, not 
only construction affects the claim frequency rate; so does services. Moreover, 
the Industrial Production Index has a negative effect on the frequency claims, 
which reinforces the conclusion that economic variables might act as powerful 
indicators on claim frequency rates. Unfortunately, no conclusive effects are 
found in Category III, which again highlights the difficulty to find suitable 
models for motorcycles and scooters.
The analysis of the residuals does not indicate problems in Categories I and 
II. P-values do not reject the normality assumption even for high significance 
levels (Table 13), and the serial autocorrelation of the residuals behaves as 
expected (Table 14). Normality tests in Category III, however, point out po-
tential problems on the fitting. The normality assumption is rejected at a 5%
level according to Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, although the other tests support 
normality at the same level.
After analyzing the results for the twelve series, two different patterns emerge. 
Generally, economic variables that represent an improvement of the economic 
situation, such as decreasing unemployment rates, increase in construction 
activity or Industrial Production Index are correlated with higher rates of claim 
frequency. However, when considering the own damage coverage, the reverse 
pattern is observed. Economic variables that reflect a booming activity are found 
to be negatively correlated with claim frequency series. A possible explanation, 
that will deserve further attention, is the strong effect that fraud might cause on 
these particular insurance policies.
FIGURE 6
DISTRIBUTIONS OF RESIDUALS. LEGAL DEFENSE COVERAGE
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TABLE 12
SUMMARY OF THE MODEL FOR LEGAL DEFENSE COVERAGE
Predictors Category I Category II Category III
CAP -0.672060
(0.41738)
CONS -2.841000**
(0.99775)
-2.991200***
(0.62955)
1.179600
(4.21516)
CONSCOST -1.437100
(1.68114)
CPI 1.754300
(1.55633)
3.647800
(3.07619)
CRIMCODE -0.001476
(0.01575)
-0.049416
(0.03209)
0.082664
(0.05765)
DRIVLIC -0.005562
(0.01421)
0.014545
(0.03246)
0.000155
(0.05116)
GDP 4.603400
(2.85061)
IPI -0.166040***
(0.03463)
MORT 0.056296
(0.15591)
OLDPOP 4.504500
(6.04279)
REAL -0.026852
(0.13601)
RET 0.111200
(0.32202)
1.486100·
(0.83474)
SERV -25.96000***
(3.79472)
TRAD1 0.027828**
(0.01021)
ARIMA model (0, 0, 1)(0, 0, 0)4 (1, 0, 0)(0, 0, 0)4 (1, 0, 0)(0, 1, 0)4
AIC -84.6266 -74.7665 -25.7142
BIC -4.6257 -4.2959 -3.0558
Notes: Standard error in parenthesis. ***, **, * and · indicate significance at 0.1, 1, 5 and 10% 
levels (t-statistic).
TABLE 13
NORMALITY TESTS OF RESIDUALS. LEGAL DEFENSE
Shapiro-Wilk Kolmogorov-Smirnov Geary
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Category I 0.96945 0.3935 0.08762 0.6716 0.78841 0.6845
Category II 0.96264 0.2740 0.10099 0.4875 0.82116 0.3240
Category III 0.94201 0.1243 0.17222 0.0328 0.85925 0.0660
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5. Conclusions
Adapting the pricing methodology to the current economic situation is a
challenging goal for the insurance industry. A deep understanding of the fac-
tors involved in the determination of realized claim frequency is a fundamental 
element in order to counteract the natural fluctuations of losses. The actual 
economic situation affects the determination of insurance rates, increasing or 
decreasing the premiums accordingly. So, companies must anticipate future 
costs to set the appropriate insurance rates.
This study extends current research on insurance economics literature aiming 
to estimate the effect of macroeconomic and microeconomic factors in the claim 
frequencies of automobile lines, while controlling for major regulatory reforms. 
As a novelty, we use data disaggregated by coverages and automobile categories.
From a wide range of potential economic explanatory variables, a stepwise 
elimination procedure allows to select a small set of candidate factors that are 
related to the claim frequencies. The methodology employed allows to deal with 
the usual non-stationarity of this type of series, as well as the multicollinearity 
among the explanatory factors. The regression procedure is based on a dynamic 
regression model, which combines longitudinal and cross-sectional elements. 
Thus, explanatory variables can be included in the regression while residuals 
are allowed to follow an autoregressive integrated moving average model, both 
for their seasonal and non-seasonal components.
Generally, our results conform with related literature. However, the distinc-
tion between coverages reveals a different behavior of claim frequency rates 
depending on coverage. In particular, we find that general liability, theft and legal 
defense respond in opposite direction to an improvement of the general economy 
as does the own damage coverage. The motivation of the distinct response may 
be caused by the different effect that fraud causes on the coverages. In the case 
of own damage, fraud seems to have a strong influence on claim frequency 
rates, increasing the number of claims as the economy weakens according to 
economic indicators. However, the opposite effect is present in the rest of claims, 
which decrease with the economic activity. This different behavior has not been 
identified in previous literature and deserves further study.
TABLE 14
AUTOCORRELATION AND SEASONALITY TESTS 
OF RESIDUALS. LEGAL DEFENSE
Ljung-Box Friedman
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Category I 14.19 0.2228 1.67 0.6444
Category II 13.57 0.2576 2.25 0.5222
Category III 8.27 0.6893 0.26 0.9679
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We leave for further research the segmentation of companies according to its 
volume. In our study we use aggregate data for the whole industry, so observed 
effects in claim frequencies correspond to the global insurance portfolio. However, 
portfolios of small insurance companies could be influenced by different factors 
than portfolios of large companies, due to the different nature of its clients and 
therefore different composition of their portfolios. A detailed analysis on this 
aspect could reveal relevant information to companies, which could be exploited 
in order to provide more accurate insurance rates.
Another natural extension of the analysis is the study of the relationship 
between economic indicators and other lines of insurance. We find home insur-
ance an interesting candidate to develop further research. The comparison of 
results between automobile and home insurance could provide more insight on 
the relationship between these two lines of insurance and the evolution of the 
economic cycle.
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